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Does mode of delivery make a difference to criminal case outcomes and clients' 
satisfaction? The public defence solicitor experiment 
Cyrus Tata, Tamara Goriely, Paul McCrone, Peter Duff, Martin Knapp, Alistair 
Henry, Becki Lancaster, Avrom Sherr 
Among UK criminal lawyers few subjects tend to give vent to as much passionate 
debate as the introduction of public defence solicitors. Although the public defender 
pilot has only recently begun in England and Wales, north of the border in Scotland 
the evaluation of the public defence experiment has recently been completed. This 
article explains some of the key findings on case outcomes achieved by “private” and 
“public” defence solicitors for similar cases; and also in terms of client satisfaction. 
In so doing, the research also raises broader questions about summary justice.  
Overview  
Over the last 25 years there has been increasing scholarly and official concern in the 
UK about the cost effectiveness and quality of publicly funded criminal defence 
services. Since the 1990s it has been the policy of governments in both Scotland and 
in England and Wales to confront apparent problems in the “judicare” system. In 
England and Wales a key policy, rolled out nationally in 2001, has been the use of 
contracting in which publicly funded criminal defence services can only be provided 
*Crim. L.R. 121 by private solicitors operating under contracts in which specified 
minimum quality standards are met. Alongside the policy of “contracting” private 
firms of solicitors, since May 2001 the government of England and Wales has opened 
eight Public Defender Offices in a mixed system of delivery as part of a four-year 
study. Although the public defender pilot has just begun in England and Wales, north 
of the border in Scotland the evaluation of a public defence solicitors scheme working 
in a mixed economy has recently been completed. This article discusses some of the 
key findings (especially in terms of case outcomes) of the study of that three-year 
pilot scheme in Scotland.  
Few subjects give vent to as much passion among criminal lawyers in the United 
Kingdom as the introduction of “staff “ or “salaried” lawyers to run alongside 
delivery by “private” lawyers. Vociferous debate about independence, quality, cost 
and client satisfaction accompanied the introduction of a three-year pilot scheme to 
test a new Public Defence Solicitors' Office in Scotland. Its introduction was 
accompanied by acrimony at both ground and senior level, with for example, the 
Edinburgh Bar Association excluding the PDSO from membership. 
In 1998, the Public Defence Solicitors' Office (“PDSO”) was established in 
Edinburgh. As part of a “mixed economy” the PDSO was intended as a pilot scheme 
to test and evaluate the provision of criminal assistance through solicitors employed 
directly by the Scottish Legal Aid Board. In its enabling legislation the Government 
was forced to make important concessions. The legislation gave the Board authority 
to set up a single office, employing no more than six solicitors, for an experimental 
period of five years. The Act also required that the experiment be independently 
monitored and a report had to be laid before the Scottish Parliament within three years 
of the start of the Office, setting out the results of the study. 
In January 1999, following an exploratory methodological study, the authors were 
commissioned to carry out an independent evaluation of the PDSO. We were asked to 
compare the delivery of legally-aided criminal legal assistance through the PDSO 
with delivery through private practitioners in Edinburgh, paid on a case-*Crim. L.R. 
122 by-case basis under the legal aid scheme. The comparison was according to four 
criteria: 
• the quality of services provided (especially case outcomes); 
• cost effectiveness; 
• client satisfaction; and 
• the contribution of each delivery method to the efficiency of the criminal justice 
system, including the impact on the courts, the procurator fiscal service, the police 
and the judiciary. 
Due to space constraints, this article will be restricted to reporting on the results in 
relation to “quality”: specifically case outcomes (limited here to conviction/acquittal 
and sentence); and secondly to client satisfaction. Findings on cost effectiveness and 
contribution to the efficiency of the criminal justice system are available in the full 
report.  
Background  
Proposals to experiment with a public defender scheme in Scotland date back almost a 
generation to 1980. The Law Society of Scotland, however, raised strong objections 
to the idea: public defenders would threaten the independence of the profession, 
interfere with the normal professional relationship between client and solicitor, and be 
unacceptable to the public. Other criticisms were that public defenders would work 
too closely with the prosecutor and put administrative convenience and cheapness 
before the interests of the accused. So, it was not until 1996 that a White Paper 
commented that rapidly rising cost of summary criminal legal aid “simply cannot be 
sustained”. The White Paper used research (somewhat selectively) which showed that 
Scottish expenditure per comparable case was far higher than that in England and 
Wales. One of the proposed reforms was that the Scottish Legal Aid Board “should 
employ on fixed salaries a small number of solicitors to provide criminal legal aid on 
a pilot basis”. The main advantage of such a scheme was not necessarily that it would 
be cheaper in itself but that it would provide an element of competition to private 
practice. In particular, it would provide a benchmark for what summary criminal legal 
aid should cost. 
*Crim. L.R. 123  Outline of methodology  
Supplemented by questionnaire surveys and interviews with practitioners, officials 
and clients, the centrepiece of the research was a quantitative study of around 2,600 
summary cases, drawn from court records. The aim was to compare a sample of 
PDSO cases with similar cases dealt with by private solicitors. We gathered 
information about case characteristics, how cases were processed through the courts 
and their outcomes (in terms of conviction and sentence). 
The imposition of “direction”: official expectation and practice  
To help the PDSO rapidly build up its volume of casework, the government decided 
that the Scottish Legal Aid Board (“SLAB”) should “direct” a random sample of 
accused people to use the PDSO. The sample was based on birth month. From 
October 1, 1998 to July 1, 2000, all January or February born people prosecuted under 
summary jurisdiction before Edinburgh District or Sheriff Court lost their normal 
entitlement to summary legal aid through a private solicitor. Instead, they were 
“directed” to use the PDSO. 
This article follows the official terminology by describing those born in January and 
February as the “directed” sample, while describing those born in November and 
December as the “non-directed” sample. However, as predicted in the prior feasibility 
study presented to the government, the word “direction” was “a misnomer”[sic]. It 
was misleading, as it suggested that some neutral agency (such as SLAB or the 
courts) could “direct”, even force, people to the PDSO. Despite a bullish official 
response to these warnings, “direction” was inherently flawed and doomed to fail. 
Private solicitors strongly resented “direction”. One solicitor described it in the 
following terms: 
“The concept of direction was frankly, in my view, ludicrous … [My clients] would 
listen with astonishment to be told that because they were born in January or 
February, I was no longer able to be their solicitor … in legal terms. A lot of people 
were really very, very angry about that. Very angry indeed.” (Private solicitor 
interview 2000)  
However, many private solicitors soon began to find ways of complying creatively 
with the rules of direction but not its intention, and so successfully undermined its 
effect. The system of direction was (weakly) enforced only by preventing private 
practice solicitors from receiving certain forms of legal aid without a waiver. Private 
solicitors could obtain legal aid to act for a directed client provided they obtained a 
waiver. As if to add felt insult to injury, the person who exercised discretion over the 
use of the waiver was the Director of the PDSO! The result was that private *Crim. 
L.R. 124 solicitors tended to blame the PDSO Director personally for any 
unfavourable decision, thus aggravating an already acrimonious atmosphere. 
The waiver system was heavily used: 59 per cent (252) of requests were granted. Of 
the four grounds for waiver, by far the most common, representing three-quarters of 
requests (187), was that the client “has a related matter being handled by his/her 
solicitors and there is good reason for continuity of representation”. Even without a 
waiver, some forms of legal aid were still available to private practice solicitors acting 
for directed clients. 
The feasibility study carried out before the PDSO opened found widespread 
discussion among the Edinburgh Bar about how far solicitors should continue to act 
for directed clients without being paid. A majority of those interviewed said that they 
would do at least some work for those born in January and February, even if they 
were not paid for it for one or more of the following three reasons. First, it was said to 
be a matter of principle: they would not let their clients down by forcing them to use 
an “inadequate” service. For some, anyone taking a job there would automatically be 
a poor defence agent: 
“I suspect … that the public defence solicitor's office will get duds. Nobody with any 
self-respect, nobody with ability who was obviously making it in the job I do would 
ever consider joining the PDSO.” (Interview with private solicitor)  
Secondly, many firms had spent several years building up their client base, and there 
were good business reasons for retaining it--especially if the clients were likely to 
lead to more lucrative indictment work, or if the direction system was abolished after 
only a short time. Thirdly, some solicitors expressed a desire to subvert the pilot. 
When discussing the type of work they would do, solicitors emphasised that they 
would do unpaid work for “good clients”. By this they meant clients with whom they 
had a long-standing relationship who appeared regularly before the courts. Clients 
who generated solemn (indictment) work were particularly valued. Solicitors also 
suggested that they might send directed clients to the PDSO for the preparation on the 
understanding that clients would return to them for the trial. 
“I will do the trial for nothing, but I won't do any preparation … They may have to go 
to court to represent themselves until the trial or they may go to the public defender.” 
(Private solicitor interview) 
“[I will say] ‘if you come to me, you're going to have to pay' (and the majority can't 
afford that) ‘so you'll have to go the public defender. Go and see him and do 
everything you are asked to do, and then come to me the day before the intermediate 
diet … and I will get you to sign a mandate'. He will have done all the work … I will 
present the mandate and get all the papers, and I'll do the trial for nothing.” (Private 
solicitor interview) 
Of represented clients, 60 per cent used a private solicitor for all or part of their case. 
A crucial implication of the low use of the PDSO by “directed” clients is that the case 
going to the PDSO would not necessarily produce the random sample that *Crim. 
L.R. 125 officials had imagined. We have dealt with the possibility of a non-
representative sample in the types of cases reaching the PDSO by subjecting the data 
to multivariate analysis. In particular, our analyses that follow are broken down 
according to three groups: private non-directed; PDSO; “private directed”. 
Comparison of process and case outcomes achieved by public and private 
defence solicitors  
A major element of the evaluation was to look at the outcome of cases. We compared 
how public defenders and private legal aid solicitors processed cases through the 
courts and what impact this had on the result, both in terms of conviction and 
sentence. 
Outcomes have been the focus of several Canadian studies comparing staff lawyers 
with their private legal aid counterparts. Reviewing research in Canada, the Canadian 
Department of Justice has stated that staff lawyers: spend less time per case than 
private lawyers; tend to plead clients guilty earlier and more often, but nonetheless 
achieve similar outcomes in terms of conviction and sentence. 
Case trajectory: influences on solicitors  
A common criticism made of Scottish summary procedure is that guilty pleas occur 
too late. From 1990 to 1995, the Scottish Office sponsored a research programme into 
summary legal aid. One of the central questions addressed by the research was how 
far the legal aid provisions influenced case progression. Did the differential payments 
between advice and assistance and summary legal aid encourage solicitors to advise 
an initial plea of not guilty, only to advise a change of plea before trial? Elaine 
Samuel argued strongly that most late pleas were driven by system factors rather than 
simply by solicitors' attempts to maximise their income through “supplier-induced 
demand”. 
The introduction of the PDSO allowed this vexed question to be revisited, affording 
greater methodological control than had been possible under a judicareonly system of 
payment. Comparing caseloads as a whole, would PDSO clients be more likely to 
plead guilty earlier than the clients of private solicitors? 
Like other studies of the lower courts around the world, most people going through 
the Edinburgh summary courts plead guilty eventually. Among nondirected clients 
using the normal legal aid scheme, 76 per cent pled guilty, either in whole or in part; 
11 per cent were abandoned by the prosecution and only 13 per cent went to trial. The 
plea rate for PDSO clients was slightly higher (at 78 per *Crim. L.R. 126 cent). 
However, this was not the main difference between the public and private solicitor 
client groups. 
The main difference was that PDSO clients pled guilty earlier. PDSO cases were 
more likely to be resolved at the pleading diet or intermediate diet, and less likely to 
be resolved on the day of the trial, either before or after evidence was led. This 
finding was robust. In the court samples, 59 per cent of private non-directed cases 
were resolved at the pleading or intermediate diet, compared with 65 per cent of 
PDSO cases. When we used multiple regression analysis to control for known 
variations in cases, the difference widened. The analysis suggested that, had the 
PDSO dealt with similar cases to those handled by private solicitors, over 70 per cent 
would have been resolved at pleading or intermediate diet (a difference that is highly 
statistically significant at the 99 per cent level). 
Advice on pleading  
It has been suggested that public defenders might pressurise clients to plead guilty--a 
criticism that emerged from both the Canadian literature and from private practice 
solicitors in Edinburgh. In interviews PDSO solicitors described similar factors to 
other private solicitors: bail, the identity of the sheriff and the fraught nature of the 
court. They were at pains to point out that they would never pressurise a client to 
plead guilty against their will. However, they were also aware that they did not 
operate under the same financial incentives as private practice. One PDSO solicitor 
described a scenario in which a client offered to plead to two out of four charges: 
“If I was a private practitioner, if I plead not guilty for him and he gets bail and I go 
along the next day to sort it out with the Fiscal's Office having got legal aid, I get paid 
£500. If I sort it out there and then at the custody court I might not get paid anything 
or I'll probably get paid £25 for filling in a pink form. So I've got a choice--I can get 
paid £25 or £500. The case will take a couple more days to sort out, the client will be 
just as happy.” (PDSO solicitor interview) 
Interviews with private and PDSO solicitors revealed differences in tone and 
emphasis. Decisions over plea are complex and driven by a range of factors. 
Technically, the decision rests with the accused, but is influenced by advice from the 
defence solicitor who in turn is influenced by the actual or expected actions of the 
prosecution and the expected reaction of the sheriff. PDSO solicitors felt that they 
were now more focused on getting on with the case. On the other hand, we found no 
evidence to suggest that PDSO solicitors put explicit pressure on clients to plead 
guilty. None of our client interview respondents complained about being “pressured” 
to plead guilty. The only criticism made of the PDSO was that they were too neutral 
and too willing to go along with whatever the client decided. This view is consistent 
with the PSDO's insistence that 
“the one overriding principle is that we would never make someone plead guilty that 
wanted to plead not guilty. If at the end of the day the client wants to plead not guilty 
and wants to go to trial, that's his decision.” (PDSO solicitor interview 2000) 
*Crim. L.R. 127 If the PDSO did influence their clients to plead guilty more often or 
to plead guilty earlier, it was through the lack of positive support to maintain a not 
guilty plea rather than through any direct pressure to plead guilty. 
We asked clients whether their solicitor had advised them on how to plead: almost 
three-quarters (74 per cent) said that they had, a figure that was identical for both 
PDSO and private clients. There was, however, a sizeable and statistically significant 
difference between directed and volunteer PDSO clients: only 67 per cent of directed 
clients reported being advised about how to plead, compared with 82 per cent of 
volunteers. In our interviews, some directed clients complained that their solicitor had 
been too neutral: “I got the feeling that he was pleading not guilty solely on my behalf 
without any input at all.” This also links in with solicitors' perceptions that the 
direction system meant that they were “living in a goldfish bowl” and had to be “very, 
very, careful in everything” that they said (PDSO solicitor interview). 
So far the results are consistent with those reported by Canadian studies. “Staff” 
(public) lawyers tended to resolve cases at an earlier stage of the process than their 
private counterparts, usually through a guilty plea. The change in economic incentives 
involved in receiving a salary rather than a legal aid payment appeared to produce a 
change in behaviour, which, although difficult to detect in a single individual case, 
was measurable over comparable caseloads as a whole. 
Do PDSO and private solicitors achieve different conviction outcomes?  
What effect (if any) do earlier pleas have on the overall conviction rate? The 
Canadian studies found that although the clients of staff lawyers pled guilty more 
often, this had no effect on the conviction rate. It would appear that staff lawyers 
correctly predicted the outcome of cases, and only advised guilty pleas in cases that 
would have ended in a conviction in any event. 
In Edinburgh the conviction rate was high for both samples. Most accused proceeded 
against summarily in the sheriff or district courts are convicted of at least something. 
We compared cases handled by the PDSO with those handled by private solicitors for 
non-directed cases. Given that the PDSO handled slightly different types of case, it 
was necessary to control for variations in case (including client) characteristics. 
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to identify what features led to no 
conviction as opposed to a conviction of some sort (whether as libelled or 
partial).Controlling for these intrinsic case factors, we found that PDSO cases were 
more likely to result in conviction. This contrasts with the Canadian studies (which 
did not control for intrinsic case factors or to a more *Crim. L.R. 128 limited extent). 
Controlling for intrinsic case features through modelling techniques, the odds of a 
PDSO client being convicted were 52 per cent higher than similar cases handled by 
private solicitors, a finding that was statistically significant at the 95 per cent level. In 
practical terms, such a difference means that, according to the model controlling for 
case variables, PDSO representation appears to have increased the chances of a client 
being convicted (of at least one charge even if reduced), from around 83 per cent to 
88 per cent. 
In general, there was a marked attrition effect. The longer an accused persisted with a 
plea of not guilty, the greater their chances of not being convicted. The chances that 
the prosecution would be abandoned were almost negligible at the pleading diet (at 2 
per cent). They rose slightly at the intermediate diet (to 4-6 per cent), and became 
appreciably greater just before the trial started, when the prosecution discovered 
whether the witnesses had appeared. Among private, nondirected cases reaching the 
day of trial, 16 per cent of cases were abandoned. The chances of no conviction were 
highest after evidence had been led (at 38-44 per cent). PDSO clients who pled guilty 
at the pleading diet or intermediate diet exchanged the small but measurable chance of 
a later acquittal or the case being dropped for the certainty of immediate conviction 
for something, at least.  
The quantitative data suggested that PDSO solicitors were more likely to conclude a 
case with a mixed plea: 55 per cent of all PDSO guilty pleas were mixed, compared to 
50 per cent of all private, non-directed cases. However, when one controlled for case 
characteristics, the finding was only significant at the 90 per cent level. 
Three-quarters of all pleas made just before trial were mixed, a rate that was similar 
for both PDSO and private solicitor cases. Thus, it seems that the PDSO was more 
pro-active in agreeing pleas earlier in the process. The effect this had on the total 
number of negotiated pleas was partially offset by the greater tendency of private 
solicitor cases to hold out until the day of the trial. 
There was no great difference in the proportion of clients convicted at each stage of 
the process. Instead, the higher conviction rate was linked to the apparent PDSO 
tendency to facilitate earlier pleas of guilty. During interviews, both private solicitors 
and fiscals suggested that if one pushed a case to trial, there was a good chance that 
the prosecution would collapse. The main reason for waiting until the trial diet was 
that “you get a better deal just before trial”. A fiscal put this point clearly: 
“A case goes through three stages: when you mark it [i.e. at the time of the 
complaint], you think, well, that'll prove. When you look at it later and cite the 
witnesses etc you think, it might prove. And when you read it through at trial *Crim. 
L.R. 129 you think it will never prove. So it's always easier to [negotiate at the trial 
diet] and I think most defence agents will tell you that. The time for [the defence 
agent] to put the screws on to get a good plea is probably … on the morning of the 
trial.” (fiscal interview) 
The interviewee was correct. Most defence agents did tell us that busy fiscals, faced 
with more trials than they could possibly handle, were particularly amenable to lesser 
pleas immediately before trial. 
There was, however, a downside to pleading guilty immediately before trial when all 
the prosecution witnesses had been forced to appear. Such strategies may irritate 
sheriffs. Several solicitors noted that sheriffs did occasionally object to such late 
changes of plea: “the sheriff might ask the witnesses into court and go through the 
lawyer like a dose of salts”. Most felt, however, that this rarely trumped the benefits 
of a late plea. In the view of one solicitor, this sometimes amounted to “a bit of 
footstamping that isn’t necessarily convincing”. Another solicitor agreed: 
“The sheriff still has to look over his back and think, well, I’ve got to sentence this 
person on what he did, and justify that to the Court of Appeal--and not lose my rag 
and say this is ridiculous.” (Private solicitor interview) 
Furthermore, solicitors could use a last minute plea bargain to divert the attention of 
an otherwise irate sheriff. On the day of trial, fiscals were often desperate to reduce 
the number of trials. As a fiscal put it: “we go to trial court with more cases than we 
can hope to prosecute, so we rely on some dropping out”. Thus it was usually possible 
for a defence agent to secure some reduction in the complaint, even if it was only in 
deletions of minor words in the charges. This would be enough to show that the client 
was not pleading guilty as libelled. As one solicitor put it: “it gives you something to 
say” so that “you feel you don’t have to explain why you didn’t plead guilty until the 
trial diet”. 
Do public and private defence solicitors achieve different sentence outcomes?  
Several Canadian studies have highlighted the fact that staff lawyers tend to achieve 
more favourable sentences for their clients. These differences reflected the fact that 
clients of staff lawyers were more likely to plead guilty earlier. By contrast, the 
Edinburgh data showed few discernible differences in sentence for similar cases. Both 
private non-directed and PDSO clients faced the same rate of imprisonment (15-16 
per cent). When they were imprisoned, they received similar lengths of sentence (an 
average of 85-87 days). Nor could we find any difference in the rate at which more 
punitive sentences (either custody or community) were imposed, compared with the 
less punitive sentences of driving disqualification, fines or admonitions. If this is the 
case it appears, on the face of this evidence, that many clients are inclined to plead 
guilty partly because of an erroneous belief that they are likely to receive a discounted 
sentence for doing so. 
From an international perspective, this is a surprising result given that PDSO clients 
were more likely to plead guilty at an earlier stage of the process. In other *Crim. L.R. 
130 English-speaking jurisdictions, it is a matter of clear practice or policy that clients 
are normally awarded sentence discounts for co-operation with the system. 
Unlike its counterpart south of the border, where, all else being equal, an offender in 
England and Wales may expect to receive a sentencing discount of up to one-half, the 
Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal has traditionally been wary of the idea of imposing 
more lenient sentences on those pleading guilty as a matter of policy. In 1987, the 
Court of Criminal Appeal remarked that sentence discounts were “an objectionable 
practice. What it involves is a form of plea bargaining … [where] an accused person 
is being offered an inducement to plead guilty early and in our opinion no such 
inducement should be offered”. While discounting is generally considered permissible 
no system of sentencing discounts has been recognised and certainly not encouraged 
by the Court of Appeal. In 1995 an attempt to encourage earlier pleas of guilty, 
sentencers were explicitly given a discretion to taken into account “the stage in the 
proceedings … at which the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty” and “the 
circumstances in which the indication was given”. The highly discretionary nature of 
the legislation contrasts with the apparently more directive provisions south of the 
border. 
From this it might be supposed that little in the way of sentencing discount does take 
place in Scotland, particularly in the summary courts, as opposed to systematic and 
widespread discounting in England and Wales. The sheriffs and justices of the peace 
we spoke to said that they would never change the character (as opposed to the 
quantum) of the sentence because of an earlier plea (a point which has been barely 
developed by the Appeal Court in England and Wales).They would not, e.g. replace 
imprisonment with community service or community service with a fine. They said 
they might, on occasion, reduce the length of imprisonment or the amount of fine, but 
they found it difficult to quantify the effect. However, while the Appeal Courts north 
and south of the border have taken distinct approaches, it would not be accurate to 
paint a picture in which sentence discounting is rife in England and Wales as a 
routine practice and yet almost non-existent in Scotland. Indeed, recent research 
south of the border has revealed relatively low levels of compliance and patchy 
practice. Equally, it may be that discounting is widespread in Scotland but in specific 
kinds of cases and at specific stages, and how these work together with the use of 
backdating of sentences; the use of consecutive, concurrent and cumulo sentencing for 
different convictions; and, representations in presentence reports.  
*Crim. L.R. 131 The PDSO Director told us that “our goal, by and large, is to keep 
clients out of prison”. The Office did several things that one might expect to have led 
to substantial reductions in the use of custody. They resolved cases at an earlier stage, 
and were more pro-active in their negotiations with the prosecution. They also 
developed links with social work agencies and tried to make the maximum use of 
rehabilitation schemes. Within the Scottish context, however, this appears to have had 
little effect. 
Clients' evaluations of public defence solicitors  
Can criminal clients make valid judgments of their solicitors?  
Whether or not it is in a client's best interests to “hold out” as long as possible, 
(possibly while remanded in custody), and endure the accompanying anxiety, or, 
plead guilty early to at least a reduced charge is highly debatable, but lawyers play a 
pivotal role in shaping that decision. Across the English-speaking world most of the 
literature on the relationship between defence lawyers and their clients has 
highlighted the passivity of clients whose wishes and expectations are managed by 
their defence lawyers. Studies of civil work also stress the importance lawyers place 
on managing their image with the client. 
It may be therefore that clients tend to be in a poor position to judge their solicitors. 
However, there has been less work investigating what clients themselves thought. One 
of the largest qualitative studies of clients was carried out by Ericson and Barenek in 
an anonymous Canadian city. They described defendants as “dependants” in the 
criminal process, whose main characteristics were low expectations, forced trust and 
an inability to judge the service they receive. Failing any other means to judge the 
service, clients fell back on outcome as the main evaluative criterion. Where negative 
feelings were expressed, it was frequently because the outcome did not match their 
expectations. At the start of the PDSO study many solicitors dismissed the idea that 
their clients were capable of judging the performance of their defence lawyer; a point 
which sits uneasily with the great importance the same solicitors attached to client 
choice in selecting or returning to a defence solicitor. 
However, the idea that clients judge mainly on outcome has been disputed. Large-
scale quantitative work suggests that process--that is, the way that clients are treated 
by the system--is very important to clients. For example, Casper, Tyler and Fisher 
analysed data from those convicted of felonies in three US cities. They concluded that 
clients' evaluations of their treatment by the criminal justice process did not depend 
entirely on the sentence received: “rather their sense of fairness--in terms of both 
procedural and distributive justice …”. 
In their study of legal aid clients in England and Wales, Somerland and Wall found 
that clients judged solicitors on a variety of interpersonal as well as technical *Crim. 
L.R. 132 criteria. Interpersonal criteria were judged highly important, a point which 
was strongly highlighted in the PDSO client interviews. Support, honesty and 
communication were all seen as crucial. Their study echoes research with matrimonial 
clients in suggesting that, unless solicitors established good rapport with clients, they 
would fail to elicit enough information to perform a technically competent service. 
Our interviews with clients confirmed the important finding of earlier work that 
criminal accused are normally passive spectators in the criminal process. Clients 
described how stressful the experience was and how little they understood of it. They 
played only a small part in the process outside the court and were largely silent within 
it. Clients readily said that they could not judge the technical aspects of what lawyers 
did. Indeed, clients' judgements about their solicitors were not primarily made on the 
basis of outcomes but on assessments of how good their solicitors were at: listening to 
them; believing them; being able to explain the process; being accessible; “standing 
up for” them, etc. 
Client confidence in their public defence solicitor before and after direction  
We tested these client care issues by asking clients to rate their solicitor on five 
criteria. Two were about accessibility: “being there when I wanted them” and “having 
enough time for me”. One was about listening; “listening to what I had to say” and 
two were about giving information: “telling me what was happening” and “telling me 
what would happen at the end”. The levels of trust and satisfaction expressed by 
directed PDSO clients were consistently lower than those expressed by clients using 
private practitioners. Directed PDSO clients were less likely to say that their solicitor 
had done “a very good job” in listening to what they had to say; telling them what was 
happening; being there when they wanted them; or having enough time for them. 
They were also less likely to agree strongly that the solicitor had told the court their 
side of the story or treated them as though they mattered. 
The influence of direction on client evaluations  
The first point to emphasise is that criminal clients valued the right to choose their 
solicitor and resented being “directed” to use the PDSO. “Direction” appeared 
strongly to mediate their views of the PDSO. When asked whether they would use the 
firm again, only 46 per cent of directed PDSO clients said that they would, compared 
with 83 per cent of private practice clients. Direction appears to be a vital influence in 
the client satisfaction results. Many directed clients first found out about the PDSO 
from private solicitors. The interviews, together with comments on the client 
questionnaires, suggested that there was widespread confusion and incomprehension 
about the system of direction. 
Even those who were otherwise very happy with the PDSO expressed some unease at 
their lack of choice. For others, however, the lack of choice undermined trust. They 
found it difficult to accept someone who had been forced on them. 
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can’t pick a lawyer and you’re made to pick the Public Defender, you lose the trust … 
They work for the system.” (PDSO client interview) 
The negative effects of direction on solicitor-client relationships were also felt by 
PDSO solicitors: 
Interviewer: How much difference do you think direction made to relationships with 
clients? 
Solicitor: A significant difference. Clients did not come through the door shouting the 
odds about being made to come here, but undoubtedly clients did not like being 
directed, clients resent that … Clients were coming in, probably resentful of being 
directed, having probably been told on occasions to have low expectations …, so I 
think undoubtedly it affects client relations, but not in an overt way, not in the way 
that you can’t manage the case … Having removed direction it reminds you again … 
how much better things are when you’re dealing with a client who genuinely wants 
you to be his lawyer.” (PDSO solicitor interview, November 2000) 
Client evaluation after direction  
We supplemented the main study of client satisfaction by sending questionnaires to 
those who had used the PDSO after direction ended in 2000. This allowed us to 
compare the responses of directed and private clients with a small sample of people 
who had used the PDSO voluntarily. The views expressed by volunteer clients were 
more positive than those expressed by directed clients, and, on the whole, were not 
hugely different from those of private clients. However, volunteers were still 
significantly less likely than private clients to agree strongly that their lawyer had told 
the court their side of the story or had treated them as if they mattered, rather than as 
“a job to be done”. The low scores generated by PDSO clients were echoed in the 
qualitative interviews, which also raised concerns about listening, providing enough 
time and giving information about the case. 
Volunteers were less likely to agree that the PDSO had “really stood up for my 
rights”: only 48 per cent agreed strongly, compared with 71 per cent of private clients. 
The difference was significant at the 99 per cent level. PDSO volunteers were less 
likely than private solicitor clients to agree strongly that their solicitor knew the right 
people to speak to, told the court their side of the story, or treated them as if they 
mattered. 
PDSO solicitors tended to be seen as more “business-like” and less personally 
committed than private solicitors. 
“He seemed a very professional guy … business-like, polite. He seemed friendly … I 
wouldnae put the guy down. I don’t think he done a bad job. I don’t think he's done a 
great job either.” (PDSO client interview 2000) 
They were also less likely to say that they would use the firm again. On this crucial 
measure of client satisfaction, both directed and volunteer PDSO clients were 
significantly less likely to say that they would use the PDSO again. Forty-six per 
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83 per cent of private clients said that they would return to the same firm. Directed 
clients were more likely to say that they would use another firm, while volunteers 
were more likely to say that they did not know what they would do. 
The ability to explain the court system was also rated highly. 74 per cent of private 
practice clients thought that their lawyer did “a very good job” in listening to what 
they had to say and 21 per cent thought they did “a fairly good job”. Only five private 
practice clients (3 per cent) said that their solicitor did “not a very good job” and two 
said they did “a very bad job”. By contrast, 53 per cent of PDSO directed clients rated 
their solicitor as doing a very good job, with 32 per cent saying they did a fairly good 
job. The scores given by PDSO volunteers were between the two: 65 per cent said 
they did a very good job and 24 per cent said they did a fairly good job. 
Reflections on the evaluation of case outcomes and client satisfaction  
In terms of case outcomes, the data presented here summarise four key findings from 
the comparison of PDSO and private solicitor performance. These are: 
(1) The PDSO was more likely than private solicitors acting for non-directed clients 
to resolve the case at the pleading diet or intermediate diet, and less likely to go to a 
trial diet. 
(2) PDSO cases were more likely to end in a conviction for something than cases 
handled by private solicitors for non-directed clients. 
(3) Even though PDSO cases were slightly (but statistically significantly) more likely 
to plead guilty and do so earlier than private solicitors, there was no difference for 
otherwise similar cases in the rate of custodial sentences imposed on PDSO clients 
compared with non-directed clients. 
(4) After the end of direction PDSO clients and private solicitor clients expressed 
broadly similar levels of satisfaction, although clients tended to complain that their 
PDSO solicitor was “too businesslike”. 
From a managerial perspective, the fact that public defenders resolved cases at an 
earlier stage has advantages. It has the potential to save legal aid costs and also 
reduced court and prosecution costs, inconveniencing fewer witnesses. Clients were 
spared the wait and worry of repeated court diets and were less likely to be held in 
detention pending the resolution of their case. On the other hand, earlier resolution 
also led to a slight (but statistically robust) higher rate in convictions. By pleading 
guilty at the pleading diet or intermediate diet, rather than holding out until the day of 
the trial, clients substituted the certainty of conviction for the possibility that the 
prosecution case would collapse. A crucial mediating factor is the client's level of 
anxiety and attitude to risk. 
What is particularly significant from the Edinburgh study is that it would appear that 
clients may not have benefited (in terms of sentence passed) from pleading guilty and 
doing so earlier than holding out to the trial. It would be useful to pursue this question 
further to see whether this apparent lack of overall sentence “discounting” masks 
specific types of cases where there may indeed be sentence “discounting”. 
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a simple matter of fact under the overall control of the accused/defendant. Despite the 
vociferous public denials by their leaders, in having to make ethically indeterminate 
judgements, solicitors appear to have been routinely influenced in significant part 
(albeit not exclusively) by the incentives under which they operate. 
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